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ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS AND THE PUBLICINTEREST LITIGANT
INTRODUCTION

Every day thousands of instances of pollution, discrimination, consumer fraud, and other similar abuses of existing laws
intended to protect the public occur which threaten the lives
and well-being of millions of individuals.' Most of these individuals can do nothing to protect themselves and the rest of the
public. The individual-unless he is one of the wealthy fewcannot sue in most cases because he simply cannot afford to
pay a lawyer to represent him. This is so because lawsuits on
environmental, civil rights, and other "public" issues are
expensive2 and because only injunctive or declaratory relief or
nominal damages-rather than substantial damages (which
could be used to help defray the cost of an attorney's fee)-are
usually available.3 Faced with these economic factors, the individual has no hope against a large, well-financed corporation
or governmental entity. Moreover, the individual cannot always expect help from the governmental agencies charged with
enforcing the laws designed to protect the public.4 Frequently
For a chilling description of the efforts of one corporation to keep its product
from being banned by the Environmental Protection Agency despite strong evidence
of its danger to the public, see Cooper, The Cure That Kills-Pesticidesin the Food
Chain, 222 NATION 274 (1976). For more on the dangers posed by certain pesticides and
pollutants, see Miller, Susceptibility of the Fetus and Child to ChemicalPollutants,
184 Sci. 812 (1974); 105 Sci. NEws 287 (1974); 106 Sci. NEws 231 (1974); TihE, Oct.
14, 1974, at 64.
2 The lawyers for the plaintiffs in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (environmental protection case) expended 4,500 hours in
preparation of their case. Goldfarb, In the Public Interest, Washington Post, June 11,1975, § A, at 18, col. 5. If their work had been billed at the common rate of $50 per
hour, the cost to plaintiffs would have been $225,000.
See 121 CONG. Rc. 5418-20 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (remarks of Representative
Seiberling); 121 CONG. REc. 14,975 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975) (remarks of Senator Tunney); King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental
Litigation, 41 TENN. L. Rav. 27, 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as King & Plater];
Comment, Liability for Attorneys' Fees in the Federal Courts-ThePrivateAttorney
General Exception, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 201, 207 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Exception].
I See Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation
Before the Subcomm. on Representationof Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 799 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General":
Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733,
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Green Light].
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such agencies either cannot or will not5 help the individual.
Many are dominated by those entities they are supposed to be
regulating. Some agencies are understaffed,' underfinanced,8
or lacking sufficient authority to act effectively. 9 Others are too
apathetic ' or too immobilized by the weight of their own bureaucracy." Additionally, the sheer number of environmental
abuses is such that probably no agency could adequately control all of them.

In view of all this, it would seem that the best and perhaps
the only system for dealing adequately with the countless
abuses of law which threaten the public would be to provide
each individual affected with some way to protect himself from
the specific abuse which threatens him.'" Prior to May 12, 1975,
just such a system was developing in the federal courts. Individual citizens had been encouraged to bring public-interest
lawsuits by recent court decisions' 3 which held that an individParents seeking the aid of school boards in ending school segregation have frequently encountered great reluctance to act on the part of the boards. "At each stage
of the proceedings the School Board's position has been that, given the choice between
desegregating the schools and committing a contempt of court, they would choose the
first, but that in any event desegregation would only come about by court order."
Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 39 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 696 (1973).
5 In Thill Securities Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971), the court noted that the history of federal
regulatory agencies teaches that shortly after their creation they tend to become dominated by the industries they were created to regulate.
I E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970) (slow progress in
controlling air pollution attributed to lack of enough skilled enforcement personnel and
lack of aggressiveness on part of EPA's predecessor agency in enforcing the law).
A See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973); Green Light at 733.
1 "[Blecause of the limited resources and potentially conflicting interests within
and among governmental entities, effectuation of the public policies toward environmental protection and housing relocation frequently depends on private. . . enforcement." La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
E.g., note 7 supra.
" See Green Light at 733.
' See Hearings at 799.
" See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v.
Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
143 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp.
1233 (D. Kan. 1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii 1972); NAACP v.
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Sims v.
Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mer., 409 U.S. 942 (1972); La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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ual who had acted as a "private attorney general" (by bringing
a lawsuit which succeeded in vindicating an important public
right or policy whose effectuation of necessity depended both
upon private enforcement and an award of fees to make such
private enforcement economically feasible) would be entitled
to have his attorneys' fees paid by his opponent. 4
These cases represented the culmination of a long evolution of American judicial attitudes toward fee-shifting. In England at the time of the American Revolution, attorneys' fees
were routinely awarded to the prevailing party in litigation.' 5
Initially, American courts followed this English rule. But then,
for some reason which has remained the subject of debate,' 6
American courts departed from the English practice and with
near unanimity' 7 came to adopt the so-called American Rule
under which each litigant pays his own attorneys' fees.'"
Over the years a number of exceptions to the American
Rule developed at the federal level. These can be classified into
two groups, statutory exceptions and equitable exceptions.' 9
," For an excellent discussion of the historical background and development of the
equitable private attorney general exception, see Comment, CourtAwarded Attorney's
Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 655-70 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
,5 See Nussbaum, Attorneys' Fees in PublicInterest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV.
301, 312 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum].
" Many theories have been advanced to explain the early break with the English
practice. E.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CAL. L. REv. 792, 798-99 (1966) (legislative error in setting fixed fees which were
"forgotten" as living costs increased); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost
of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75, 81 (1963) (desire to encourage participation in legal
system by average man); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216, 1220-21 (1967) (early American individualism); Comment
at 640-41 (distrust of lawyers).
" Today, only a few states have meaningful fee-shifting statutes. E.g., ALAS. R.
Civ. P. 82(a) (1963) and ALAS. STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973); N.V. REv. STAT. §18.010(3)
(1973).
'" For a more complete discussion of the historical background of the American
Rule, see Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L.
REv. 1216, 1217-21 (1967); see Comment at 640-44. The American Rule has been
criticized by many commentators over the years. E.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 16;
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?,49 IowA L. RFv. 75 (1963);
McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin]; Stoebuck,
Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202
(1966); Comment at 648-55. For discussions of some of the arguments raised in defense
of the American Rule, see McLaughlin at 780-82; Comment at 642-44.
" Green Light at 734-35.
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Congress has enacted a variety of statutes20 explicitly authorizing the federal courts to award fees in a wide range of situations. The federal courts, invoking their inherent equity power
to prevent injustice, have also developed "equitable" exceptions to the American Rule. 21 For example, where a party has
acted in bad faith in litigating a suit or his "obdurate behavior"
necessitated the suit, federal courts have awarded attorney fees
to his opponent under the "bad faith-obdurate behavior" exception.2 Under the "common fund-substantial benefit" equitable exception, federal courts have awarded fees to a party
when his prosecution of a suit resulted in a substantial benefit
to an identifiable class of persons and the court's jurisdiction
of the case enabled it to spread the cost of attorneys' fees
among the class benefited. 23
Recently, a number of the lower federal courts began
applying a new equitable exception which seemed to be a logical and valid extension of the "common fund-substantial benefit" exception-the "private attorney general" exception. 24 The
" E.g., statutes cited in notes 37 & 57 infra. For a discussion of such statutes and
their application in different areas of the law, see Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in
Civil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379, 392-99 (1973); Macey,
Award of Attorney Fees as a Stimulant to Private Litigation under the Truth in
Lending Act, 27 Bus. LAWYER 593 (1972) (consumer protection); Note, Allowance of
Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 381, 390-400 (1971);
Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
CORNELL L. REv. 1222, 1228-29 (1973) (environmental protection); Comment,
Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1656 (1972) (antitrust); 7 GA. L. REv. 578 (1973) (civil rights).
21 For a general discussion of these and other exceptions to the American Rule,
see King & Plater at 38-50; McLaughlin at 765-70; Comment at 645-48.
2 E.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963). For a general discussion of the bad faith-obdurate behavior exception, see Green Light at 735, 737-38.
" The "common fund" equitable exception began as a limited exception and was
later greatly expanded by the federal courts. CompareTrustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527, 532 (1881) with Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939)
and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973). For a general discussion of the common fund
- substantial benefit exception, see Green Light at 736, 739-41.
2 For in-depth discussions of the private attorney general exception as viewed in
different contexts, see Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379, 411-15 (1973); King & Plater at 48-58, 62-92;
Nussbaum at 325-37; Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNmL L. REv. 1222, 1237-46 (1973); Green Light at 742-55;
Commentary, Civil Rights-Attorney's Fees-Attorney's Fees May Properly Be
Awarded Successful Plaintiffs ChargingRacial DiscriminationUnder 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1970), 24 ALA. L. Rxv. 163; Exception ; 40 FoRDHAm L. REv. 714 (1972)(civil rights
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career of the exception was brief. On May 12, 1975, the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society 5 ruled that although the federal courts possessed the
equitable power to award fees in "common fund-substantial
benefit" cases, they did not have such power in the closely
related "private attorney general" cases. The Court held that
express Congressional authorization would have to be provided
before the federal courts could exercise such a power.26
Reaction to the decision from public interest lawyers,
Congressmen, and others 8 was swift. The decision was criticized both in the House 29 and in the Senate" and remedial
legislation was introduced. Now, over a year later, no further
action has been taken by Congress 31 to provide the statutory
litigation); Comment, The Discretionary Award of Attorney's Fees by the Federal
Courts: Selective Deviation from the No-Fee Rule and the Regrettably Brief Life of
the PrivateAttorney GeneralDoctrine, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 588, 611-61 (1975)(in general).
- 421 U.S. 240 (1975). For lengthier discussions of Alyeska, see Note, A Giant Step
Backwards: Alyeska PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society and Its Effect on Public Interest Litigation, 35 MD. L. REv. 675 (1976); Note, Attorneys' Fees-Rejection of
the PrivateAttorney GeneralException, 6 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 481 (1975); 4 FoRDHAM
URBAN L.J. 211 (1975); 50 TuLANE L. REv. 161 (1975).
28See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269, 271
(1975).
21Public interest lawyers were distressed because court-awarded attorneys' fees
had appeared to be a promising source of funds for them as foundation giving decreased. 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1603 (1975). Ralph Nader noted that the ruling was
"going to have a very depressive impact on the ability of public interest lawyers to
litigate." 105 TIME, May 26, 1975, at 42. Charles Halpern, staff director, Council for
Public Interest Law, termed the decision a "disaster." Weaver, Public Interest Lawyers Shocked by Supreme Court's Denial of Attorneys' Fees to the Winners of
Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, § 1, at 29, col. 1. For more on the public interest
law movement, see Halpern, Public Interest Law: Its Past and Future,58 JUDICATURE
118 (1974).
11An editorial in the Washington Post described the decision as a "critical blow
to a faltering [public interest law] movement" and called on Congress to act. Goldfarb, In the PublicInterest, Wash. Post, June 11, 1975, § A, at 18, col. 3. A New York
Times editorial remarked that in the environmental, consumer, and civil rights areas,
"[wlithout remedial legislation . . . it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to
translate many glittering legislative promises into daily realities." N.Y.Times, June
2, 1975, at 24, col. 1. Reaction from legal commentators was generally critical. See, e.g.,
sources cited note 25 supra.
11E.g., 121 CONG. REc. 5418-20 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (remarks of Representative Seiberling).
121 CONG. REc. 14,975 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975)(remarks of Senator Tunney).
, No action has been taken on H.R. 7826, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) which
would provide the statutory authorization required by the Supreme Court. 2 CCH
1975-76 CONG. INDEX 5010.
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authorization required by the Supreme Court before fees can
again be awarded on a private attorney general basis-legislation which could be the most far-reaching in its beneficial effect of any considered in this century.
One gets the impression that the political influence of
large corporations is being strongly pressed in the halls of Congress concerning this legislation.2 One also gets the impression
that part of the Congressional inaction may be due to great
uncertainty as to how a statute with such far-reaching possibilities should be specifically formulated in order to attain its
goals without overloading the court system or without opening
the door to frivolous or harassing suits. 33
In an attempt to relieve some of this uncertainty, each
major issue (with one exception) 34 which would probably be
raised in debates over the exact language of such a statute will
be discussed and the most relevant considerations applicable
to each will be explored. Primary attention in most instances
will be given to the experience of the federal courts in awarding
fees under the equitable private attorney general exception,
but, when appropriate, material will also be drawn from the
experience of the English judicial system with fee-shifting and
that of the Congress in providing for statutory fee-shifting. At
the conclusion of this discussion a statute will be proposed
which, hopefully, if enacted, would achieve the goals of the
private attorney general fee-shifting concept without imposing
any adverse effects upon the federal court system.35
32For a revealing expression of industry attitudes toward fee-shifting in general,

see Hearings at 1115-28 (testimony of Godown, general counsel, National Association
of Manufacturers).
" See generally Hearings at 791 (testimony of Kline, attorney, Public Advocates,

Inc.).
1' The question of whether to allow an award of fees to a private attorney general
who sues the United States will not be discussed. This issue involves so many ramifications that it is properly in itself the topic of an entire Comment. At present such awards
are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) unless specifically authorized by statute. For a
brief discussion of some of the strong arguments in favor of allowing such an award,

see Hearings at 791-92 (testimony of Kline, attorney, Public Advocates, Inc.).
3' For the purposes of this discussion, the great value of allowing the award of
attorney fees on a private attorney general basis is presupposed. For some of the
arguments which have been raised in favor of this concept, see Hearings at 799-804
(testimony of Kline, attorney, Public Advocates, Inc.); Nussbaum at 331-37; Green
Light at 733-34. For some of the relatively few criticisms which have been expressly or
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To WHOM SHOULD FEE AWARDS BE AVAILABLE?

Should Awards Be Limited to Plaintiffs?

All cases in which the federal courts utilized the equitable
private attorney general exception to authorize an award of fees
involved an award to a plaintiff who had acted as a private
attorney general rather than to a defendant. 6 However, as Congress has recognized in considering fee-shifting legislation, it is
conceivable in the procedural posture of some cases (e.g., certain declaratory judgment suits) that a defendant could act as
a private attorney general as well.3 7 Thus, to provide for that
eventuality eitherparty, rather than a plaintiff only, should be
eligible for an award of fees in a statute whose purpose is to
encourage private attorney generals to vindicate important
public rights and policies.
impliedly leveled at the concept, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 263-69; Hearings at 1118-27 (testimony of Godown, general counsel,
National Association of Manufacturers).
I E.g., Brandenbrger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974); NAACP v.
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Sims
v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
31See S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 n.42 (1975). The federal statutes
which authorize federal courts to award fees in specific situations can be classified into
three main groups: (1) those which authorize a mandatory award of reasonable fees to
a prevailing plaintiff, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act § 309(f), 7 U.S.C. § 210(f)
(1970); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act § 7(b), 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970);
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3)
(Supp. V, 1975); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 tit. IX § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V, 1975);
Railway Labor Act § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); Communications Act § 206, 47
U.S.C. § 206, (1970); Interstate Commerce Act § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 908(b) (1970); (2) those which authorize a discretionary award of reasonable fees to a prevailing party, e.g., Copyright Act § 116, 17 U.S.C.
§ 116 (1970); Education Amendments Act of 1972 tit. VII § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617
(Supp. V, 1975); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. II § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) 1970);
Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); and (3) those
which authorize a discretionary award of reasonable fees to either party, e.g., Securities
Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77K(e) (1970); Trust Indenture Act § 323(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77WWW(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
78r(a) (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amends. of 1972 tit. V § 505(d),
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. V, 1975); Clean Air Amends. of 1970 § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-2(d) (1970); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. V,
1975).
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Should Awards Be Limited to the PrevailingParty?

Most federal statutes limit the award of fees either to prevailing plaintiffs ,or to prevailing parties." Similarly, most of
the federal courts which applied the private attorney general
exception authorized awards of fees only to private attorney
generals who had prevailed on at least one of their original
claims. 39 This practice should be continued. The award of fees
should be limited to the prevailing party. By so doing, flooding
the federal courts with frivolous or merely harassing suits can
be discouraged. 0
If awards are thus limited to prevailing parties, however,
it should be understood that the term prevailing means
"success" in the lawsuit in a "realistic" sense and not necessarily in a "technical" sense.4' Federal courts have authorized the
award of attorneys' fees to a party when his opponent entered
into a consent decree without stipulation of liability,42 when a
party's opponent modified a challenged practice after being
sued,43 when a party obtained some but not all of the original
relief sought," and when a party technically prevailed on some
but not all of the issues he raised.4 5 A party should be considered to have "prevailed" if he has forced his opponent to settle
a lawsuit on terms favorable to himself." It is submitted that
See, e.g., statutes cited note 37 supra.
See, e.g., cases cited note 36 supra.
"
Since in most private attorney general cases, the private attorney general is not
well funded, substantial damages are rarely recoverable, and cases are time consuming; an attorney is not likely to take on a frivolous or "nuisance" suit when his only
likely source of remuneration will be an award of attorney fees to his client if he
prevails. Nussbaum at 333. See generally Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedureand JudicialAdministration,2 J. LEGAL STUDiES 399, 437-38 (1973). See also
Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38
U. Cm. L. REv. 316, 334-35 (1971).
11 Congress has recognized in considering fee-shifting legislation that fee awards
should be made to private citizens who, in attempting litigation to enforce public
policies, achieve their objectives despite not having prevailed in a strictly "legal"
sense. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971); S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong,
2d Sess. 38 (1970).
,2Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1974).
10Hammond v. Housing Authority & Urban Renewal Agency, 328 F. Supp. 586,
588 (D. Ore. 1971).
" Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1244-53
(D. Kan. 1973).
, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1973).
" Settlement due to pressure of the private attorney general's lawsuit should be
"
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a federal court should consider a private attorney general to
have "prevailed" if he has substantially vindicated an important public right or policy as a result of his carrying on the
lawsuit.47 Substantial vindication could be achieved by a number of methods which stop short of complete technical victory,
including but not limited to those mentioned above.48
C.

Limitations on Eligibility

It would be a mistake to enact a statute in which fees
would be awarded in private attorney general litigation to the
prevailing party without further limitation on eligibility. Such
a rule would discourage private attorneys general from bringing
(or defending) suits except in the rare case in which their probability of victory was almost certain, because the typically underfinanced private attorney general would have to pay both
his own enormous legal expenses and his opponent's attorneys
fees as well if he lost.49 For the same reason, this rule would
greatly discourage private attorneys general from bringing suits
in new or developing areas of the law where the outcome of a
suit is often highly unnpredictable, thus depriving the law of
much of its vitality and ability to adapt to new and changing
circumstances. 0
Instead, the statute should award fees only to a prevailing
grounds for an award for the additional reason that settlement often clears court
calenders and prevents waste of court time.
See generally Exception at 216-19.
,8The requirement of "substantial vindication" should be considered satisfied in
cases in which the only result of the private attorney general's lawsuit is that the
defendants are forced to comply with statutes requiring certain reports to be filed
concerning a project's impact on the environment. See King & Plater at 81. However,
this requirement should not be considered to have been met if the only result of the
private attorney general's lawsuit is that the public is made more "aware" of a problem
or that an uncertain area of the law is more clearly defined. In Sierra Club v. Lynn,
364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), modified, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), the court
awarded attorney fees to a plaintiff who did not technically prevail on any of the issues
he had raised. The award seems to have been made on the theory that, although the
plaintiff did not technically prevail, his lawsuit forced the defendant to complete and
file certain studies required by federal law which would probably not have been completed and filed without the impetus of plaintiff's suit. Id. at 849-50.
" Cf. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
Exception at 205.
0 Cf. Comment at 651-52. See also Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination
of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. Rxv. 26, 31-32 (1969).
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party who has acted as a private attorney general by (1) substantially vindicating an important public right or policy and
(2) by conferring a substantial benefit upon the public or a
significant class thereof (3) in an area of the law in which such
private vindication is necessary if important rights and policies
are to be fully meaningful and (4) in which an award of attorney fees is essential if such private enforcement is to be economically feasible." If this is done, no private attorney general
will be discouraged from bringing (or defending) a suit through
fear of having to pay his opponent's attorney fees, because only
a valid private attorney general-and not his non-private
attorney general opponent-will be eligible for an award of fees
(unless, of course, the private attorney general acts in bad faith
in litigating the suit). If the court found that both parties had
acted as private attorneys general-a most unlikely possibility-it could exercise its discretion and refuse to tax attorney
fees against either party.2
II.

WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHEN

A PREVAILING PARTY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A PRIVATE ATTORNEY

GENERAL?

A.

Judicial Guidance

The successful experience of the federal courts in applying
the private attorney general exception provides some guidelines in exploring this question. Also helpful, although to a
lesser extent, is a consideration of some of the fee-shifting statutes53 which Congress has enacted and the legislative history of
those statutes. More emphasis will be placed on the experience
of the federal courts in applying the court-created equitable
private attorney general exception, however, since the goal is
to develop a private attorney general statute which is adapted
to the needs and capacities of the federal court system.
When the cases are examined in which fee awards were
authorized on either an express or implied private attorney
general basis, four distinct criteria emerge as those favored by
"These criteria are discussed in Part 11 infra. See note 54 infra.
52 See generally Part I infra.
Some of these statutes are listed at note 3 supra.
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the federal courts. In most of these cases the court authorized
an award of fees to a prevailing party when his lawsuit involved
the substantial vindication of an important public right or policy, by prevailing in the lawsuit he conferred a substantial
benefit on the public or a significant class thereof, necessity
existed for private vindication if the right or policy involved
was to be fully meaningful, and an award of fees was necessary
if such private vindication was to be economically feasible.,'
It is submitted that these four criteria should be included
in any private attorney general statute. They were designed
and utilized by the very federal courts which would be authorized to make awards under such a statute, and it is reasonable
to expect that courts selected these specific criteria with both
a desire to encourage the basic purposes behind the private
attorney general fee-shifting doctrine and a desire to select
criteria whose use would not innundate or otherwise prove
harmful to the federal court system. Furthermore, a substantial amount of case law concerning the application of each
criterion was amassed during the life of the equitable private
attorney general exception which would prove useful to the
courts in deciding close questions under the new statute.
B.

Relevant Considerations

1. Vindication of an Important Public Right or Policy
If these four criteria are adopted, what considerations are
most relevant to each? The first criterion-that the suit must
involve the substantial vindication of an important public right
or policy- has often been cited as a difficult subject for judicial determination.5 How can a court determine that one right
" See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1250-52 (D. Kan. 1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955-56 (D. Hawaii 1972); La
Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98-101 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In.La Raza Unida the
court stated: "[A] 'private attorney general' should be awarded attorneys' fees when
he has effectuated a strong Congressionalpolicy which has benefited a large class of
people, and where further the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement
are such as to make the award essential." Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
u E.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 696 (1973); Comment, Civil Rights-Attorney's Fees-Attorney's
Fees May Properly Be Awarded Successful Plaintiffs ChargingRacial Discrimination
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), 24 AIA. L. REv. 163 (1971).
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or policy is important and another is not important and thus
not deserving of protection through encouraging its vindication
by the award of attorney fees? Admittedly, such a determination is not easy, but courts routinely must make similar determinations in other areas of the law. 6
Several guides as to the importance of various rights and
policies are available. Rights or policies very similar in nature
to those already protected by Congress through expressly authorized fee awards should certainly be considered sufficiently
important.5 7 The quantity or wording of legislation which Congress has produced to further a particular right or policy may
also provide some indication of the importance which Congress
attaches to it.51 Legislative history can also indicate such importance." Almost any federal constitutional right should be
considered an important right, and particularly those that have
" E.g., the Supreme Court has determined on a case-by-case basis that certain
rights contained in the Bill of Rights are so fundamental that they are applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment while certain other of those rights are
not.
57 Some of the rights and policies thus encouraged by Congress include: right to
fair competition (antitrust)-Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); consumer protection-Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1975); crime controlOrganized Crime Control Act of 1970 tit. IX § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970);
fair employment practices-Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. V, 1975); environmental protection-Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amends. of 1972 tit. V § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. V, 1975); right to nondiscrimination in public accommodations-Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. I § 204(b), 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)(1970); right to non-discrimination in employment- Civil Rights
Act of 1964 tit. VII § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
" The quantity of legislation enacted to protect the right to vote has been cited
as indicating the importance attached to that right by Congress. "[C]ongressional
policy strongly favors the vindication of federal rights violated under color of state law
.. . and, more specifically, the protection of the right to a nondiscriminatory franchise. See the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437,42 U.S.C. § 1973; the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S. C. § 1971; of 1960, 74 Stat. 86, and of 1957, 71 Stat.
634; and U.S. Const., amends. XIVandXV." Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694-95
(N.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The wording of a particular statute sometimes indicates either expressly or by
implication the degree of importance attached to the right or policy which the statute
advances. "And. . . § 1983 [42 U.S.C. § 1983] expresses a strong policy of vindicating
federal constitutional rights against infringement by state officials. . . ." Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). See Gilpin
v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1250-51 (D. Kan. 1973);
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
1' E.g., S. RE. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1975) (civil rights described as
"fundamental rights").
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been considered so fundamental that they are applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment." Also, a right upon
which a high social value is placed should be considered important." Of course, many rights and policies have already been
identified as being sufficiently important to warrant feeshifting by virtue of the federal courts' application of the equitable private attorney general exception.62 One further test of
importance is whether substantial injury to the public or a
class thereof would occur if the rights or policies were not enforced.63 The courts can give more definition to what is important as they proceed on a case-by-case basis.
The possibility of over-inclusiveness in this first criterion
(or the second) resulting in a flood of litigation should not be
feared, because the third and fourth factors discussed below are
strong limiting factors on the exercise of the award of fees.
Thus, no right or policy should be "disqualified" unless it is
,0Compare Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 950, 955 (D.Hawaii, 1972) (first
amendment right to free speech applied through fourteenth amendment against
county official) with Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure applied through
fourteenth amendment against municipal officers). "Appellees' litigation served the
public interest by vindicating the strong public policies favoring the protection of
constitutionalrights." Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281,
286 (6th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
"1Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 23, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure).
12 Fee awards were authorized in cases involving a wide range of rights and policies. See, e.g., Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir.
1974) (constitutional rights of prisoners); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885,
889 (9th Cir. 1974) (constitutional right to travel); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852
(1st Cir. 1972) (right to non-discrimination in rental of housing); Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (right to non-discrimination in rental
of housing); Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 125051 (D.Kan. 1973) (elimination of sex discrimination); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366
F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (antitrust); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.Hawaii 1972) (first and
fourteenth amendment right to free speech); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390
(M.D. Ala. 1972), modified, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (right of mental patients to
adequate treatment); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd,
493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (fourteenth amendment right to nondiscrimination in state
employment); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S.
942 (1972) (fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights to reapportionment); La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
13 See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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clearly of a non-essential nature, if the purposes of the private
attorney general doctrine are to be served.
2.

SubstantialPublic Benefit

The second factor, the conferring of a substantial public
benefit, is also difficult to determine precisely. In this area, the
experience of the federal courts in applying the private attorney general equitable exception is the best guide. 4 The vindication of an important right or policy was often considered to
qualify as the required substantial public benefit the private
attorney general had conferred, 5 and in fact there is a good deal
of interaction between the first two criteria. 6 Concerning the
number of people who must be benefited for the benefit to be
sufficiently "public," it is interesting to note that fee awards
were often court-authorized when only one or a few persons
were directly benefited, although many more might have been
indirectly benefited (or would be directly benefited in the future by changes in the law, governmental practices, etc. occasioned by the private attorney general's lawsuit)." "Benefits"
for which fee awards were authorized have been many and
varied, ranging from forcing the state to provide adequate
" Congressional fee-shifting statutes and their legislative history provide little
overt data on what a "substantial public benefit" is. But a quick perusal of some of
the statutes authorizing fee awards (listed at note 37 supra) and some of the rights and
policies intended to be furthered by fee awards (listed at note 57 supra) would seem
to indicate that Congress has limited fee-shifting to those areas in which its use would
benefit at least indirectly either the entire public or large classes thereof.
0 E.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974) (right of
interstate travel free from forfeiture of welfare benefits); Gilpin v. Kan. State High
School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1252 (D. Kan. 1973) (right of women to
equal participation in school athletic competition); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691,
694 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to "free and equal suffrage"). In Gilpin the court noted,
"By vindicating her own rights, a successful litigant accordingly dispels the 'chill' cast
upon the rights of others." Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n supra at
1252.
" It has been suggested that to require the vindication of an important right and
the conferral of a public benefit is redundant, because in most cases the vindication
of an important right or policy will ipso facto confer a public benefit. See Green Light
at 749.
11 E.g., Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir.
1974); Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1252 (D.
Kan. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (M. D. Ala. 1972), modified, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99, 100 (N.D. Cal.
1972); see Comment at 672.
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treatment at a mental hospital to forcing reapportionment of

the Alabama state legislature.68
Again, there should be little danger of "opening the flood-

gates" through the liberal definition of a "substantial public
benefit," because the two criteria below will serve to limit the
scope of the private attorney general exception without defeating its purpose in any way.
3.

The Necessity of Private Enforcement

The third standard involves the necessity of private legal
action if public rights and policies are to be vindicated fully.

Congress, in providing for fee-shifting in various statutes, rec-ognized that "private enforcement" is necessary if certain fed-

erally created rights and policies are to be meaningful.69 Private
enforcement is necessary when public enforcement entities ei-

ther do not exist or do not fully protect public rights and policies. Lack of public enforcement may exist for a variety of
reasons. The effectiveness of public agencies and officials is
often restricted by inadequate funding, 0 poor organization,"
conflicts of interest, 2 domination by the very industries being

"regulated,"73 official apathy or refusal to enforce the law un-

less forced,

and myriad other reasons. The sheer size and

" E.g., Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1252
(D. Kan. 1973) (in addition to conferring other benefits, contributing to the definition
of the permissible limits of sex differentiation); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (benefiting marketplace by
vindicating antitrust policy); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391-92, 409 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (forcing state to provide adequate treatment at mental hospital); Sims v.
Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 692-94 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (forcing reapportionment of Alabama
state legislature).
11"Such a provision [authorizing award of attorney fees] is appropriate in voting
rights cases, because there, as in employment and public accomodations cases, and
other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the
fundamental rights involved." S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1975) (emphasis added). See, e.g.,S. REp. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970); S. REP. No.
414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79-82 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 132
(1972) (Congressional recognition of necessity of private enforcement of certain environmental policies).
' See sources cited note 8 supra.
, See, e.g., Green Light at 733.
72 See, e.g., Green Light at 733; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
" See note 6 supra.
, See, e.g., note 5 supra.
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complexity of the task make public enforcement of certain
rights and policies virtually impossible.7 5 The federal courts in
authorizing fee awards under the private attorney general exception recognized that private enforcement is sometimes necessary in several areas of the law. 7 The courts also recognized
that private enforcement is often necessary when the "public"
attorney general is representing defendants sued for violating
public rights and policies in an action brought by a "private"
attorney general, 77 or when such defendants are the very public
officials charged with the enforcement of the rights or policies
7
violated. 1
Based on their experience, it would seem proper to award
fees whenever, from the facts of a particular case, it is apparent
that full vindication of a right or policy is not being or cannot
be accomplished by public enforcement mechanisms. But, if
such mechanisms are available and are being used effectively
by public officials to vindicate the right or policy involved
fully, no fee should be awarded.
,"In a nation that now exceeds one trillion, forty six billion dollars in
gross national product, government cannot possibly be relied upon to provide
vindication of every person or entity aggrieved by a violation of the antitrust
laws. It must be left to private litigants to guarantee to themselves the
assurance that the future will not repeat the past ....
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Cal
1973).
"1See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1251 (D. Kan. 1973) (constitutional rights); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 848
(W.D. Tex. 1973), modified, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974) (civil rights and environmental
protection); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (antitrust); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (environmental protection and housing relocation).
" See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 n.5 (9th Cir. 1974).
' "Because the public authorities normally charged with the enforcement of the
law are defendants in this action, the only practicable means of enforcing section 1983
is by private parties.. . ."Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949,955 (D. Hawaii 1972). "The
only public entities that might have brought suit in this case were named as defendants
in this action and vigorously opposed plaintiffs' contentions. Only a private party could
have been expected to bring this litigation. . . ... La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D.
94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Public officials were defendants in a great many of the cases
involving an equitable award of fees to a private attorney general. See, e.g., Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson,
493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F.
Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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4. Necessity of Award in Order to Make PrivateEnforcement
Economically Feasible
The fourth and final criterion, necessity of award in order
for private enforcement of the right or policy to be economically
feasible, is possibly the least difficult to utilize. In determining
if such a necessity exists, four factors are particularly important: (1) the financial resources of the party seeking to vindicate a certain right or policy; (2) the financial resources available to his opponent; (3) the amount of damages, if any, potentially recoverable (which could be used to defray the private
attorney general's legal expenses); and (4) the cost of litigation
to vindicate the right or policy.
The use of these factors can be illustrated by utilizing
them to determine if fee awards are necessary to enable private
vindication of statutorily created civil rights, a determination
which Congress has already made.79 In the typical civil rights
case, the plaintiff seeking to vindicate his rights is poor. 0 His
opponent is usually either a corporation or governmental entity
with imposing financial resources.81 In the typical civil rights
case damages either are not recoverable or are recoverable only
in nominal amounts, 2 and the cost of litigation is usually awesome.ss These factors combine to produce a situation in which
hard economic reality dictates that the typical would-be private attorney general is forced to forego any attempt to vindi11See, e.g., S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-42 (1975). "All of these acts
[federal civil rights acts passed since 1866] depend heavily upon private enforcement,
and fee awards are an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful
opportunity to vindicate these important Congressional policies." Id. at 42 (emphasis
added).
See Exception at 207.
" See Comment at 660. See also Hearings at 835, 841-43 (discussion concerning
great advantages which corporations hold over private attorneys general in public
interest litigation).
82 This is true not only in civil rights cases but also in environmental protection
cases. See Exception at 207. In most equitable private attorney general cases in the
federal courts, only injunctive or declaratory relief or insubstantial damages were
recovered. E.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Gilpin v. Kan. State
High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1244 (D. Kan. 1973); Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 19 (N.D. Cal. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D.
94, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
83 See note 2 supra. See also Hearings at 799-800 (enormous expense involved in
public interest litigation against a governmental agency or large corporation).
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cate his rights. Fee awards are necessary in such cases if private
vindication of rights is to be possible.
The federal courts which authorized awards of fees under
the private attorney general equitable exception had little difficulty in considering such factors to determine if awards were
necessary.84 Those courts found that such necessity existed not
only in many civil rights cases but also in certain environmental protection, civil liberties, reapportionment, and other cases
as well." Fees were not awarded to those rare private attorneys
general who were financially able to act as private attorneys
general without an award of fees.8"
In considering this last criterion, the situation of the public
interest law firm deserves special mention. When a private
attorney general is represented without charge by a public interest law firm, the public interest law firm, rather than the
private attorney general, should be awarded fees if an award is
necessary for it to be able to represent those who seek private
enforcement of the right or policy involved. The court should
remember that public interest law firms are becoming increasingly dependant on fee awards for their continued ability to aid
such clients as foundation "seed money" is exhausted."
III.

DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF FEES

Should the courts be given total discretion to award or not
"

The test for this final criterion used in the federal courts can be expressed as

follows: Is the financial burden of private enforcement of the particular right or policy
such that an award of fees is essential if such private enforcement is not to be discouraged by economic realities? See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities
Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1250-52 (D. Kan. 1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955

(D. Hawaii 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
" See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1251-52 (D. Kan. 1973) (sex discrimination); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955-56

(D. Hawaii 1972) (civil liberties); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala.
1972) (civil rights); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Ala.) (reapportionment); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (environmental
protection and housing relocation).
1,Thus, in Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii 1972) fees were awarded

to plaintiffs-intervenors but not to plaintiffs, who were represented by Legal Services'
attorneys. The court reasoned that, "Legal Services' attorneys can function as private
attorneys-general irrespective of whether this court awards them counsel fees." Id. at
955-56.
" See generally Adams, Responsibile Militancy-The Anatomy of a Public InterOF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE Crry OF N.Y. 631, 644

est Law Firm, 29 Ta REcoRD
(1974).
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to award fees to the prevailing private attorney general, or
should the award be mandatory once the prevailing party's
private attorney general status is established? In England,
courts routinely award fees to the prevailing party unless considerations of equity demand otherwise.8 8 In America, feeshifting statutes expressly authorizing federal courts to award
fees are largely divided into a group of statutes in which the
award is mandatory to a prevailing plaintiff, a group in which
the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party, and
a group in which the court may award fees to either party.89 The
best course for a private attorney general statute to take would
seem to be one that would allow a court enough discretion to
deny or even reverse fees when a would-be private attorney
general's suit was frivolous or brouglt to harass, but not
enough discretion to deny fees to a private attorney general
who had acted in good faith in bringing a suit and had prevailed. Thus, frivolous and bad faith litigation would be discouraged, while at the same time good faith vindication of
important rights and policies would be encouraged by the enhanced certainty of being awarded attorney fees if the suit were
successful. Also, some provision should be made so that those
statutes in which fee awards are presently totally mandatory
or totally discretionary would not be changed by the private
attorney general statute."
All of these objectives would be accomplished by a statute
reading in part, "Unless contrary to existing statutory provisions or considerations of justice demand otherwise,92 the court
8 See Mayer & Stix, The PrevailingPartyShould Recover Counsel Fees, 8 AKRON
L. REv. 426, 430-31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mayer & Stix]. English courts have
discretion to not only deny fees to a prevailing party but to award attorney fees to an
unsuccessful party when a plaintiff refuses a fair settlement offer and recovers less after

trial as well. Id.
See, e.g., statutes cited note 37 supra.
The criteria used to determine whether or not a party is a valid private attorney
general are discussed in Part II supra.
. " See 121 CONG. REc. 5419 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (remarks of Representative
Seiberling). Those fee-shifting statutes which Congress has already enacted have been
fashioned in a precise manner designed to best accomplish the specific purpose of each.
Thus, no need exists for their repeal or modification.
2 Thus, the courts clearly could still invoke their "bad faith" equitable exception
and tax attorney fees against the would-be private attorney general who brought a
frivolous or merely harassing suit. The primary purpose of the words "unless considera"
"
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shall award fees to a prevailing party whose status as 'private
attorney general' under this statute has been established."93
IV.

How SHOULD THE AMOUNT OF FEES AWARDED BE
DETERMINED?

A.

"Reasonable" Attorney Fees vs. a Fixed Amount

In England, "reasonable" attorney fees are awarded," and
almost all of the Congressional statutes providing for an award
of attorney fees in specific areas of the law prescribe
"reasonable" attorney fees as the amount of the award.95 In
addition, most federal courts have awarded "reasonable" fees
in applying the equitable private attorney general exception. 6
On this question, practicality dictates that no attempt be made
to fix the amount of attorneys' fees which can be recovered.9"
Because of our inflationary and otherwise unpredictable economy, any fixed schedule" of recoverable attorneys' fees would
tions of justice demand otherwise" is to make absolutely clear that the courts are to
award attorney fees to the private attorney general unless overriding considerations of
justice are present.
'3 Cf., S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1975).
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 20-21 (N.D. Cal. 1973). But the
English courts often make use of fixed fee schedules prescribing the amounts that may
be recovered for various specific legal tasks in determining the overall "reasonable"
fee award. See, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
n.18, citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967).
11See, e.g., statutes cited note 37 supra. The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act tit. V § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970) is exceptional in that it
provides for a fee award which constitutes a "reasonable part of the recovery."
" See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1974); Lee
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703, 708 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693 n.3 (M.D.
Ala. 1972). However, several federal courts either used or advised the use of a fixed
schedule of fees in the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A(d) (1972) as a guideline in determining reasonable fees. E.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st
Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973), modified, 502
F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
"7 But cf., Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 CoLuM. J.L. &
SocALuPnon. 381, 410-11 (1971) (legislature should provide that court start with a
specified fee base and then consider additional criteria to use in making appropriate
increases or reductions according to particularities of the case involved).
1 A provision setting a fixed percentage of total damages recovered as the measure
of the attorney fees award would also be unsuitable for a private attorney general feeshifting statute, since nonmonetary equitable relief is often the only remedy available

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65

have to be constantly revised to keep pace with the changing
cost of living.9 This would have to be done if one of the basic
purposes of fee-shifting, i.e., making the injured party realistically "whole," ' is to be accomplished.
It could be argued that awards should be limited to low
fixed amounts so as neither to deter the non-private attorney
general from engaging in litigation with the private attorney
general nor to "punish" him for doing so. But reasonable attorney fees will not deter the large well-financed corporations''
and government entities, which tend to be the private attorney
general's opponents, from participating in litigation. Not only
are such fees small in relation to the financial resources usually
available to such parties, but the fees are small when compared
to the high economic stakes involved in the typical private
attorney general suit from the non-private attorney general
viewpoint (particularly in environmental litigation).
An award of reasonable fees does not "punish" the nonprivate attorney general for participating in the suit, but rather
serves to make the injured private attorney general really
"whole" by reimbursing him the attorneys' fees expended in
gaining redress for his injury." 2 Moreover, the typical oppoto the private attorney general. 121 CONG. REc. 5418 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (remarks
of Representative Seiberling).
" Indeed, one legal commentator has advanced the theory that the English rule
was replaced by the American rule, not because of any conscious choice, but because
a fixed schedule of recoverable attorney fees was "forgotten" by a legislature over a
long inflationary period. Amounts which were reasonable when set became so nominal
over time that the courts gradually stopped shifting fees at all. Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. Rxv. 792, 798-99
(1966).
'0 See Mayer & Stix at 429-30.
Il The attorney fees of such corporations in public interest litigation are often
subsidized by the government and their cost is spread to the taxpayer by the device of
allowing deductions for business-related attorney fees from taxable income as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Tunney, Foreword;Financingthe Cost of Enforcing Legal Rights, 122 U. PA. L. Rxv. 632, 633 (1974). In this way the federal government
often contributes almost half of the corporation's expenses in defending itself from the
private attorney general's public interest litigation. Hearings at 854. The corporation
receives this subsidy regardless of merit, reasonableness, or success of the suit.
Hearingsat 835. But public interest law firms are also subsidized in part by the federal
government, because such firms are funded largely by tax-exempt foundations. Tunney, supra, at 633.
"I Cf., Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VmD.
L. Rav. 1216 (1967).
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nents of the private attorney general, large corporations and
governmental entities, are not greatly damaged by fee awards
because they are in a unique position to spread the cost of the
fee award among their customers or constituents. The award of
reasonable attorney fees makes it more possible that poor private attorneys general 0 3 will be able to have the same high
quality legal talent available to present their viewpoints that
has always been available to their corporate and governmental
opponents.' 0
Finally, the award of reasonable rather than fixed fees will
discourage the use of excessive delaying tactics by a private
attorney general's opponent who thereby hopes to "run up" the
private attorney general's legal expenses to such a degree that
he will eventually be forced to drop his suit even though he may
have had a very strong case on the merits.'' Reasonable rather
than fixed attorney fee awards will also encourage settlement
when it is clear that the private attorney general will prevail
at trial and thus help clear court calendars.' 8
B.

Determininga "Reasonable" Fee

Courts in both England and the United States have proven
themselves able to determine the amount of a "reasonable" fee
without encountering the problems 7 which some predicted
would arise. In England at the close of the case, the prevailing
party's attorney submits his estimate of his fee to the court. If
"

See Exception at 207.

"5 Cf., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1974).
"I On the other hand, fear that a statute allowing the award of non-fixed
"reasonable" attorney fees would encourage delay by the private attorney general
aimed at running up his own attorney fees in order to "scare" the opponent into
settling is totally unjustified. The private attorney general could not recover for legal
expenses necessitated by such delaying tactics, because fees so incurred would be
considered unreasonable and thus not taxed. Furthermore, the court could always
exercise its equitable discretion to deny fees totally or even award fees to the private
attorney general's opponent under the "bad faith" equitable exception to the American

rule.
'" Cf., Exception at 204.
'' "[Tihe time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the ques-

tion of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for
judicial administraton." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 718 (1967).
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the other party agrees to pay it, no further involvement by the
court is needed. If the parties disagree, the issue is submitted
to a special taxing master who determines what is a reasonable
fee. In making his determination he considers awarding fees
only for legal work that was necessary, reasonable, and proper.
Thus fees incurred through excessive caution or as a result of
mistake are not awarded.108
If the prevailing litigant has abused the system by unnecessarily running up his legal expenses by use of delaying tactics, for example, he may be denied all or part of his fees. Abuse
of the system is rare."0 9 The cost incurred by the court in determining the proper fee award is assessed in a manner which
encourages litigants to agree to a reasonable fee amount rather
than requiring a taxing master to decide the issue. If less than
one-sixth of the original estimate offered into court is disallowed by the taxing master as unreasonable, the party who
refused to agree to it must pay the costs of the fee determination. If more than one-sixth of the original estimate is
disallowed, the litigant who offered it must pay the costs."'
In the United States, courts have used different methods."' The federal courts are experienced in the determination
of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees because of their
long history of making such determinations under the many
federal fee-shifting statutes which call for the award of reasonable fees."12 Courts tend to consider similar factors in determining what are reasonable fees under different statutes. For example, in ascertaining what constitutes reasonable attorney
fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Federal Copyright
Law, '3 courts generally have considered the following to be
1' Mayer
20

Id.

& Stix at 430-31.
at 431.

,, Comment at 638 n.7. Further information concerning the English system is

contained in R.

JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND (6th ed. 1972).
'" For example, the judge rather than a taxing master normally makes the deter-

mination. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp.
1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
112E.g., statutes cited note 37 supra.
"I "In all actions, suits, or proceedings under this title, except when brought by
or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and the
court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." Copyright Act § 116, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970) (emphasis added).

1976]

COMMENTS

important elements: result achieved, legal work necessary,
legal work actually done, level of skill required, time expended,
distance traveled, lawyer's professional standing, and amount
of damages involved. The actual fee charged is not considered."4

In determining reasonable fees under the Federal Antitrust
Law attorney fee provision,"' courts use such factors as the
nature of the legal question presented, its novelty and complexity, the result achieved, competence, experience, and professional standing of counsel, amount of legal fees commonly incurred in such actions, time and labor expended, and the
amount of damages involved."'
The federal courts also gained experience in determining
reasonable attorney fees while applying the equitable private
attorney general exception. Different methods and combinations of methods were used by different courts. In some cases,
both litigants stipulated prior to the court's ruling on the attorneys' fee award question what a reasonable award would be if
the court ruled in favor of the private attorney general. 7 Other
courts relied upon or recommended on remand the use of the
fee schedule contained in the Criminal Justice Act"' as a
"I Mayer & Stix at 434-35 and cases cited therein. Judges do not consider each
factor mechanically. For example, in Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 122
(2d Cir. 1962), although the attorney had spent a great amount of time in preparing
the case, the court considered it to have been largely a result of his unfamiliarity with
the field and awarded substantially less than what would have been typically charged
for the amount of time expended. Mayer & Stix at 435 n.38, citing Orgel v. Clark
Boardman Co., supra. In most cases awards have been generous. Mayer & Stix at 435.
"I "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue [implying that only plaintiff may
recover attorney fees] . . . and shall recover . . . [damages], and the cost of suit,

including a reasonableattorney's fee." Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added). See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and ClassAction Antitrust Litigation, 60 CAL. L. Rav. 1656 (1972).
"' See, e.g., Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 390
n.15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). After
considering such factors, courts' fees awards have usually been both realistic and
generous. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra at 222 ($100,000); Wynn
Oil Co. v. Purolator Chemical Corp., 391 F. Supp. 522, 528 (M.D. Fla. 1974) ($553,602).
"I E.g., NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 708 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ($3,500
stipulated as "reasonable") (employment discrimination case); Sims v. Amos, 340 F.
Supp. 691, 693 n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ($14,822.50 stipulated as "reasonable") (reapportionment case).
"a 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1970). The Criminal Justice Act provides for the
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"reasonable guide""' in determining a reasonable fee.'2 1 Many
courts' 2' relied upon or recommended the use of guidelines set

down in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,'22 a case
involving a statutorily authorized award of reasonable fees.
Factors to be considered under these guidelines were: (1) time
and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the legal questions involved; (3) skill required; (4) preclusion of other employment due to acceptance of the case; (5) usual fee for similar
work in the community; (6) whether fee was fixed or contingent; (7) any time limitations involved; (8) amount involved
and results obtained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability of
counsel; (10) "undesirability" of the case (representation of
clients associated with unpopular causes can have an economic
impact on an attorney's practice which should be considered by
the court); (11) nature and length of the attorney's professional
relationship with the particular client; and (12) fee awards in
similar cases. The guidelines also provided detailed instructions as to how each factor was to be weighed and its underlying
considerations analyzed.1'2
award of attorneys' fees to an attorney appointed by the court to represent an indigent
criminal defendant at a rate of $20 per out-of-court hour and $30 per in-court hour.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
,, Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
' See, e.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972); Gilpin v. Kan.
State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F.. Supp. 1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1973) ($1,150
awarded in sex discrimination case); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D.
Tex. 1973) ($20,000 awarded in environmental law case); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ($36,754 awarded in case involving constitutional
right of mental patients to adequate treatment). In Gilpin the court stated:
A member of the legal profession has the obligation to represent clients who
are unable to pay for counsel and also to bring suits in the public interest.
While embarking upon their duties, they should not be motivated by a desire
for profit but by the public spirit and sense of duty. Accordingly, although
those who satisfy these responsibilities should be adequately renumerated for
their most valuable services, their fees should not be exorbitant.
S. . [The role of the attorney involved in public interest litigation
[can be likened] to that of the attorney representing an indigent criminal
defendant under the Criminal Justice Act.
Gilpin v. Kan. State High School Activities Ass'n, supra at 1253.
"' See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 (5th Cir. 1974).
' 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
"2 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
Concerning factor (5), the court in Johnson advised that the fee award for strictly legal
work should never be awarded at a rate less than the $20 per hour prescribed by the
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Ideally, a private attorney general statute should provide
2
for determination'"
of reasonable fees by a process combining
the best of both the English and American systems.1 5 Under
such a system, the prevailing private attorney general would
present a statement of his attorneys' fees into court, and if his
opponent agreed to them, no further involvement by the court
would be necessary. 2 1 If, however, the parties disagreed, the
judge would hold a very brief evidentiary hearing (on the record)'2 in which he would make a determination based on factors similar to those discussed above.
The courts should guard against placing too much emphasis on the actual number of hours spent by counsel working on
the case, so the efficiency of counsel would not be indirectly
discouraged.' 2 8 In addition, emphasis should not be placed
upon the amount of monetary recovery in determining fee
amount,"'2 because in a private attorney general case the importance of the issues involved often has little or no relation to
the amount of damages potentially recoverable. In many private attorney general cases only equitable, nonmonetary relief
is available.' 0 In considering each factor, the court should at
all times keep in mind that reasonable attorney fees are being
determined; legal expenses which were unnecessary, deliberCriminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1)(1970). Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., supra at 718.
'2 For a thorough discussion of several alternative methods of determining fee
awards, refer to Comment at 701-12.
"25Whatever process is chosen, the courts should be encouraged to develop consistency in its application. Otherwise, attorneys may be discouraged from taking private
attorney general cases because of their inability to predict the amount of a probable
fee award should they prevail. Cf., Comment, Attorneys'Fees in Individual and Class
Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1656, 1657 (1972).
22 Cf. Mayer & Stix at 441-42.
22 A brief recorded evidentiary hearing would allow the basis of calculation of the
fee award to be more readily reviewable by the appellate court. See Allowance of
Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SocIAL PROB. 381, 411 (1971);
cf. Comment at 706-07. Also, the trial court's judgment itself should elucidate the
factors which contributed to the final decision on the amount of the fee award. See
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
22 See Comment at 703.
'" No award should be reduced because the result achieved is an intangible,
nonpecuniary benefit such as the vindication of a fundamental right rather than a large
damage recovery. Cf. S. Rop. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1975).
I" See sources cited note 3 supra.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65

ately "run up" in an attempt to "scare" the opponent into
settling, 3 ' or otherwise unreasonably incurred should not be
included in the award. Thus, there should be no reason to fear
that fee awards will be inflated because they are "reasonable"
rather than fixed.' 2
The court, however, should not hesitate to include in its
award the reasonable fees incurred in preparing and presenting
specific arguments which were reasonable and advanced in
good faith as part of the prevailing private attorney general's
case, but which were not accepted by the court.'33 If the injured
private attorney general has substantially prevailed in the
case, he should be reimbursed for all the reasonable expenses
which his attorneys had to incur in their successful attempt to
get relief. If he is to be made truly "whole," this must be

done. 134
Once the judge has made his determination, the cost of
that determination should be assessed against the prevailing
private attorney general if more than one-sixth of his statement
of fees was disallowed. If less than one-sixth was disallowed, his
opponent should have to pay the cost. This method of assessing
costs will help insure that lengthy contests as to the
"reasonableness" of fee awards will be rare. Review of trial
court awards of reasonable attorney fees should be based on the
"abuse of discretion" standard.'3 5
"IThis tactic is discussed at note 105 supra.
12

'

See generally Mayer & Stix at 430-31.
See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir.

1973).
'" One commentator has suggested that the court should award - mewhat higher
than actual "reasonable" fees to a private attorney general's attol ay in order to
account for the contingency element faced by attorneys who specialize in public interest law. Such attorneys are not fairly compensated for their services to the public by
awards of "reasonable" fees in cases in which they prevail, he argues, because they
receive no compensation for their good faith efforts on behalf of the public in cases in
which they do not prevail. Comment at 708-11. This argument has merit, but it must
be remembered that it would be unfair to a losing good-faith non-private attorney
general to have to pay a greater amount in attorney fees than was needed to make the
party he injured "whole." But see City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471
(2d Cir. 1974) (court ruled it proper to consider contingency factor faced by attorney
in antitrust litigation in determining size of statutorily authorized "reasonable" fee
award).
'1 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
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C. Awards to Those Not Obligated to Pay Their Attorneys
Most courts have authorized the award of attorneys' fees
in private attorney general cases (including cases involving statutorily authorized awards) even when the private attorney
general was under no legal obligation to pay his attorneys, as
is often the case when public interest law firms are involved in
litigation. 3 ' Only a few judges have opposed the practice. 117 If
fees were denied in such cases, the poor who seek to vindicate
their rights would be hard put to find attorneys who could
afford to represent them, since private attorney general cases
are often expensive to litigate. The ability of public interest
firms to engage in litigation would also be greatly damaged.'38
If the main purpose behind the private attorney general
doctrine-to encourage the vindication of important public
rights and policies by private citizens-is to be fulfilled, awards
must be allowed when private citizens are represented without
charge by public-minded lawyers.'39 In order to get the most
public benefit from such an award, it should be paid directly
to the attorney who has accepted the pro bono publico case
rather than to the nonobligated private attorney general client,
since it is the attorney rather than the client who needs recomIn See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974) (private attorney general represented by ACLU attorneys); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d
598, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1974) (private attorneys general represented by Ford Foundation
attorneys); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1970)
(court awarded statutorily-authorized attorney fees to private attorney general despite
lack of showing that she was obligated to pay any attorney fees).
"I E.g., Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955-56 (D. Hawaii 1972) (private attorneys general acting as plaintiffs represented by Legal Services were denied fees; private
attorneys general acting as plaintiffs-intervenors represented by private counsel were
awarded fees).
12 The Ford Foundation is the source of a large percentage of the operating funds
for several public interest law firms. However, the Foundation has made it clear that
its contributions are only "seed money" and other sources of financing will have to be
found in the future. Adams, Responsible Militancy-TheAnatomy of A PublicInterest
Law Firm, 29 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 631, 644 (1974).
W It is true that the prospect of attorneys' fees does not discourage the
litigant from bringing suit when legal representation is provided without
charge. But the entity providing the free legal services will be so discouraged
[if fee awards are denied because services are provided without charge], and
in award of attorneys' fees encourages it to bring public-minded suits when
so requested by litigants who are unable to pay.
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974).
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pense for the work he has done and the expenses he has incurred.'40
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing research and reasoning, the following statute is suggested:
Unless contrary to existing statutory provision or consid-

erations of justice demand otherwise, the court shall award
reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party whose status
as a private attorney general under this statute has been
established. To be considered a private attorney general, a
party by carrying on his lawsuit must have (1) conferred a
substantial benefit on the public or a significant class thereof,
and (2) substantially vindicated an important public right or
policy whose full effectuation of necessity depends both upon
private vindication and an award of fees to make such private

vindication economically feasible.
Reasonable fees shall be determined in the following
manner. At the close of trial, the prevailing party shall submit to the court an estimate of his reasonable attorney fees.
If the other party agrees to this estimate, such estimate shall
be stipulated as reasonable by the court. Lacking such stipulation the court or a master appointed thereby shall determine the amount of a reasonable fee award in a brief evidentiary hearing. Reasonable fees shall be determined in such
case by a balanced consideration of such factors as novelty
and complexity of the legal question involved, time and labor
required to present the case, usual fee for similar work in the
community, results obtained, experience, reputation and
ability of counsel. Additional appropriate factors may also be
considered. Only reasonable, necessary, and proper fees shall
be taxed. Cost of the determination in such manner shall be
taxed against the party submitting the estimate if more than
one-sixth of his estimate was disallowed, and against the opposing party if less than one-sixth was disallowed.

A common complaint today is that the individual has little
power to do anything about the great national problems which
affect him. By enacting such a statute, Congress, which too
4I See id.
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often must capitulate to the demands of special interests rather
than to the public interest, and which too often lacks sufficient
time and resources to deal adequately with each of the complex problems facing the nation, could in one gesture give
power to those who have been powerless, advance the public
interest, and provide a mechanism by which each of the numberless problems which affect the public could be dealt with
adequately by the very individuals most affected.
John L. Fowler

